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Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to evaluate the impact of firm, industry level determinants and ownership
concentration on the dynamic capital structure decision in Indonesia and analyses the governing
theories.
Design/methodology/approach – This study uses the dynamic panel model of generalized method of
moments-System (one-step and two-step) by using a panel data from 2000 to 2014 to examine the
relationship between the determinants and leverage. The results are robust to the various definitions of
leverage, heterogeneity, autocorrelation,multicollinearity and endogeneity concern.
Findings – Growing firms and firms operating in a highly concentrated industry use high level of debt,
taking advantage of the tax shield (trade-off theory). However, if the firms are operating in a highly
dynamic environment, they take on less debt as to avoid bankruptcy risk. Firms in Indonesia opt for debt
financing perhaps to act as a controlling mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts that may exist between
the large controlling shareholders and the minority. Aged and highly profitable firms with high tangible
and intangible assets and liquidity level operating in a high dynamic environment follow the pecking order
theory.
Research limitations/implications – This study does not perform each industry regression individually.
All the industries are pooled together, as the main focus of this study is to examine the factors affecting
leverage of firms in general without giving particular attention to individual industry.
Originality/value – The insights on the impact of ownership concentration and industry characteristics
are novel especially on Indonesia, thus fill the gap in the literature.
Keywords Indonesia, Ownership, Emerging market, Capital structure, Thin capitalization
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
When a firm decides on its financial assistance methods either using debt or equity
or even a combination of both, firms need to take into account several influencing
factors in their capital structure. Capital structure is undoubtedly a crucial element in
the operation of a firm which aims primarily at reducing cost of capital as well as
achieving maximum firm value (Khaw, 2019; Musallam, 2020) and serve as strong
pillars that lend competitive advantage to a firm (Kumar et al., 2017; Zamzamin et al.,
2021). Recognized as an important subject matter of discussion because of its
significant influence over firm value, it has been a highly debated issue among
researchers and policymakers in the finance literature, covering the developed as
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well as the emerging markets over the decades worldwide (Haron, 2016; Kumar
et al., 2017; Ramli et al., 2019; Khaw, 2019).
In the past few decades, researchers and policymakers realize the importance of capital
structure studies in the emerging market. The body of knowledge starts to examine whether
the emerging and developed market landscapes share similar atmosphere and influencing
factors in their capital structure decision or are they expected to be different due to different
institutional and country specific factors as well as its individual corporate governance
system (De Jong et al., 2008; Muchtar et al., 2018; Khaw, 2019). Reacting to this, this study
gives a particular attention to the emerging market, particularly in the East Asian region.
History sees these markets been severely affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis
because of, as commonly reported, the mismanagement of the corporate governance
system (Brahmana et al., 2019). Realizing this fact, there has been an urgent call for a
comprehensive review and a post-mortem on the corporate governance system then to
restructure the governance system and to look closely at each of its mechanism.
Researchers and policymakers then agreed that one of the main mechanisms contributing
to sound and effective corporate governance is the ownership structure; thus, this aspect
needs to be scrutinized and studied even further (Utama et al., 2017; Khaw, 2019;
Musallam, 2020). Claessens et al. (2002), Utama et al. (2017), Brahmana et al. (2019) and
Musallam (2020) assert that the East Asian markets including Indonesia are popularly
known as having a highly concentrated ownership structure and mostly are family
controlled. This kind of environment can easily trigger agency problems between the
controlling shareholder and minority shareholders and thus may have such prevalent
influence and impact on the capital structure decision of the firms (Chen and Strange, 2005;
Utama et al., 2017; Khaw, 2019). This situation offers intriguing setting for a capital structure
study more so being an emerging market; thus, this study intends to do so.
With respect to the above background, this study sets four distinctive objectives. First is to
examine the impact of firm level determinants on the dynamic capital structure of firms
using a dynamic model of the generalized method of moments (GMM). This study focuses
on an emerging market of Indonesia, being the largest economy in Southeast Asia
(Soetanto and Liem, 2019) and the second largest emerging economy behind China
(Brahmana et al., 2019). This study uses a set of longitudinal data over a period of 15 years
from 2000 to 2014, covering 402 firms in Indonesia. Second is to examine the impact of
industry characteristics on the capital structure of firms in Indonesia. Industry
characteristics in this study include the industry dynamism, industry munificence and
industry concentration. Third, acknowledging the argument made in previous findings that
ownership structure is a crucial mechanism in corporate governance, this study intends to
examine at how ownership structure influences the capital structure decisions of firms in
Indonesia as well. Indonesia is featured by higher ownership concentration and family
control (Claessens et al., 2002; Utama et al., 2017; Brahmana et al., 2019; Musallam, 2020),
weaker legal system and investor protection and weaker disclosure requirements (La Porta
et al., 1999; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Carney and Hart, 2015; Brahmana et al., 2019).
Indonesia’s capital market is thus a perfect setting to investigate further the impact of
ownership on firm capital structure. This will enrich the literature covering the emerging
market. Fourthly, this study then concludes its finding by analysing and identifying the
governing capital structure theories to explain the behaviour of the capital structure of firms
in Indonesia as depicted. These four objectives highlight the significance of this study
comparative to others as it tackles four important aspects in a capital structure study using
an emerging market background. It offers policy implications to take into account when
choosing, deciding and implementing effective capital structure decision as well as a
perfect corporate governance system of not just for emerging market but also other markets
as well. To date, to the best of our knowledge, there is no similar study incorporating and
analysing the impact of ownership structure plus the influence of industry characteristics on
the financing decision of firms in Indonesia.
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This study found growing firms and firms operating in a highly concentrated industry use
high level of debt, taking advantage of the tax shield (trade-off theory [TOT]). However, if
the firms are operating in a highly dynamic environment they take on less debt as to avoid
bankruptcy risk. Firms in Indonesia opt for debt financing perhaps to act as a controlling
mechanism to mitigate agency conflicts that may exist between the large controlling
shareholders and the minority. Aged and highly profitable firms with high tangible and
intangible assets and liquidity level operating in a high dynamic environment follow the
pecking order theory (POT).
The structure of the study is as follows. The next section 2 looks at the literature review of
related theories and previous studies on capital structure. Section 3 elaborates the
determinants and hypotheses development and followed by the data and methodology in
Section 4 . Section 5 explains the analysis of the findings and the discussion of the results
while Section 6 concludes the study.
2. Literature review
Massive empirical analyses and evidences have been documented in the literature to
understand the financing choices of firms. Modigliani and Miller (1958) first initiated the
study of capital structure, later referred to as the MM irrelevance theory. The MM irrelevance
theory argues that in an efficient and perfect market, capital structure is irrelevant to the
value of the firm and firms should be indifferent in choosing between debt and equity
financing. This proposition triggers various streams of capital structure studies in the body
of knowledge contending the irrelevance theory of being unrealistic and highlighting that
there are in reality unavoidable frictions such as taxes in the capital market. Acknowledging
the argument, Modigliani and Miller then modify their theory by including tax in their 1963
study and interestingly report that the presence of tax shield on debt has significant
influence on the value of firm. Modigliani and Miller (1963) findings reveal that when there is
tax in the corporate income and interest from debts are tax deductible, higher firm value is
more achievable using debt financing comparative to issuing equity. This means that highly
leveraged firms are more valuable due to the interest tax shield (Brigham and Ehrhardt,
2015). This encourages firms to rely heavily on debt financing, as interest tax shield can
minimize the amount of tax burden. To use the interest tax shield that comes with debt
financing, firms come up with a tax planning strategy, known as thin capitalization. OECD
(2018) defines thin capitalization as the strategy of a company to structure their financing
with relatively high level of debt instead of equity as to reap the tax shield. This phenomenon
definitely affects capital structure decision of firms. However, thin capitalization impacts
government revenue significantly as the government spending on its operation and on the
infrastructure relies on its revenue via tax regime. Therefore, the government introduces thin
capitalization rules to limit the thin capitalization activity (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2015).
As for the case of the country understudy, Indonesia first issues its thin capitalization rules in
1984. However, after six months of implementation, the Ministry has decided to postpone its
implementation because of its threat to investment growth in Indonesia. In 2015, after
30 years of postponement, the thin capitalization rules are reintroduced with several new
guidelines and definitions of debt and equity. The new rules are effective in the 2016 fiscal
year (Pratama, 2017).
Following the inclusion of tax in the work of Modigliani and Miller (1963), the body of
knowledge later introduces new capital structure theories to explain further the behaviour of
capital structure across firms and countries. TOT highlights on the trade-off between the
benefit of debt because of debt tax shield and the cost of bankruptcy. POT is in favour of
the use of internal rather than external financing and secured rather than unsecured
securities (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Khaw, 2019). Apparently, the credibility of the manager
and the performance of the firm are reflected by the financing method chosen.
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The agency theory, on the other hand, looks at the mitigation of agency conflicts, conflicts
that occur between the shareholders and managers. Alleviating the cost arising from such
conflict is translated into achieving an optimal capital structure (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). As reported in the body of knowledge, mitigating agency conflicts require sound and
effective corporate governance system, and being one of the crucial mechanisms in
effective corporate governance system, ownership structure can assist in easing off the
agency conflicts between the shareholders and managers. In a concentrated ownership
structure such as Indonesia, wealth expropriation can occur where the controlling
shareholder, being the largest party, has the advantage and bigger opportunity to
expropriate the firm’s wealth at the expense of the minority shareholders (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997; Brahmana et al., 2019). According to the agency theory, misalignments of
interests between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders may occur as the
largest shareholder, being the controlling party has the privilege and advantage to enjoy
substantial private benefit comparative to the minority shareholders. La Porta et al. (1999)
and Khaw (2019) highlight this notion further by claiming that firms with highly concentrated
ownership structure operating in less-developed markets with weaker minority shareholders
protection are more susceptible to agency problems.
Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that current capital structure is actually the cumulative
outcome of past attempts to time the market. This argument introduces the market timing
theory and stresses that market valuation persistently influences capital structure of firm.
2.1 Past studies on Indonesia
History witnesses Indonesia undergoing several significant reformations in its financial
system because of its financial market activities then were sedentarily gloomy with massive
flaws in the firm’s financing choices. State-owned banks were seen dominating and
monopolizing the debt market and over shadowing the capital market (Moosa and Li, 2012;
Musallam, 2020). The gloomy atmosphere in the financial market then forces responsible
parties to come out with robust financial deregulations and reformations. The reformation
sees the government losing control over initial public offering, active capital raising
exercises by firms in the equity market and healthy competition between the state and
private banks (Musallam, 2020). After undergoing significant reformations, in the long-term
perspective of 2016 to 2020, Indonesia’s average real growth rate is predicted to remain
high at 5.5% per year, higher than the average real growth rate of 5.2% among Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as reported by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) (OECD, 2018) and continue to remain the biggest
economy in the Southeast Asia (Soetanto and Liem, 2019).
Several empirical and survey studies on Indonesia provide interesting findings in the
literature. Ang et al. (1997) document good access to sources of funds such as debt and
equities for firms in Indonesia based on the responses they received from their survey on
capital structure and dividend policy on the Chief Effective Officers (CEOs) of 180 firms
listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). The good access is reported to be due to the
fairly reasonable interest rate and not because of information asymmetry, thus indicating of
no POT influence in this case. Another study that does not provide evidence of POT
influence in the capital structure of firms in Indonesia is by Ruslim (2009). He finds that
profitability which is a stylized empirical fact representing the influence of POT has
nevertheless no significant effect on the capital structure of 18 firms understudy in
Indonesia within the period of six years from 2000 to 2006. Bunkanwanicha et al. (2008), on
the other hand, include corporate governance structure in their study on Indonesia and
report a high consumption of debt among firms with weaker corporate governance system
especially during financial turmoil. They also acknowledge significant influence of country-
level determinants on empirical results.
PAGE 692 j JOURNAL OF ASIA BUSINESS STUDIES j VOL. 15 NO. 5 2021
The effects of some firm level determinants on capital structure may not support the stylized
empirical facts documented in the literature as revealed by Moosa and Li (2012). Their
study on 162 publicly listed firms extracted from the 2009 annual reports reveals that not all
important determinants in previous studies are important after all as in the case of
Indonesia. Their study reveals only liquidity shows significant influence on capital structure.
They argue that mixed result reported in the literature is perhaps due to different models
and methods used in every empirical study done in the literature. They also discover that
the financial reformation experienced by Indonesia have made positive impacts on the
financial market and corporate financial policies and eliminated all inefficiencies during the
dominance of state banks.
Using common important determinants in the study of capital structure, Saadah and Prijadi
(2012) discover significant influence of TOT and POT in the capital structure decisions of 53
manufacturing firms in Indonesia during the study period from 2001–2008. This lends
support to Myers (2003) testimonial that a collaboration of theories will better explain the
capital structure behaviour in any market settings. Hardiyanto et al. (2014) conclude firms in
Indonesia strive for target capital structure and maintain debt ratio to ensure high firm value.
Using a panel data from year 2005 to 2011 on 228 companies, they argue that certain firm
level determinants have significant influence on leverage thus to maintain the target
leverage, managers must be aware of the cost that the firm may incur should they change
or adjust their capital structure en-route value maximization.
Ramli et al. (2019) report significant influence of several determinants on the capital
structure decision of 90 Indonesian firms from 1990 to 2010, whereas Haron (2016) reports
on the financing decisions of 365 listed companies from 2000 to 2011, and Haron and
Adeyemi (2016) on a smaller sample size of 290 listed firms from 2000 to 2014. POT seems
to play substantial role in explaining the capital structure decision as well, resulting from
financial deregulations where internal financing is also substantially preferred in financing
investments and projects, not merely bank loan as previously discussed. Firms are also
seemed to time their equity issuance indicating a market timing theory of capital structure
as explained by Baker and Wurgler (2002).
Nevertheless, most of these studies reviewed above are not fit to represent the general idea
of the behaviour of capital structure of the firms in Indonesia, partly due to small sample
firms and not controlling for endogeneity. For instance, Ruslim (2009) uses a rather small
sample of 18 firms in his study, and Moosa and Li (2012) takes only cross sectional data in
the year 2009 to conclude on the capital structure of the firms. A recent study by Ramli et al.
(2019) only cover 90 firms for a study period 1990–2010 and not addressing endogeneity
problem, despite endogeneity being a major concern in panel data (Soetanto and Liem,
2019; Musallam, 2020). Responding to these limitations, this study examines a wider span
of study period from 2000 to 2014 and uses 402 firms as sample. Manually collected data
on ownership structure from the annual reports covering the period from 2000 to 2014 are
gathered and thorough examinations carried out on the capital structure of firms in
Indonesia offers useful and comprehensive insights and can be of good reference for future
research thus fills the gap in the literature.
The body of knowledge also witnesses empirical evidences where firms with highly
concentrated ownership in Indonesia often face agency problems between controlling
shareholders and the minority shareholders as well (Driffield et al., 2007; Siregar and
Utama, 2008; Carney and Hart, 2015; Utama et al., 2017; Brahmana et al., 2019; Musallam,
2020). Referring closely with the findings from related studies and the manually collected
data from annual reports of firms throughout the study period, this study investigates further
the impact of ownership structure especially highly concentrated ownership on the capital
structure of firms in Indonesia. The findings from this study will be of useful reference to
other countries which share similar ownership landscape especially among the emerging
market thus enriches the literature.
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3. Determinants of capital structure and hypotheses development
This study incorporates firm- and industry-level determinants plus ownership structure to
understand further the capital structure of firms in Indonesia.
3.1 Non-debt tax shield
Frank and Goyal (2009), Ameer (2010) and Khaw (2019) assert that non-debt tax shield
(NDTS) should be negatively correlated with leverage as NDTS is the alternative to tax
shields that comes with debt financing. Annual depreciation expenses to total asset
represent NDTS in this study following Frank and Goyal (2009) and Khaw (2019). The
hypothesis is that:
H1. NDTS has a negative influence on capital structure.
3.2 Firm size
Being less affected by information asymmetry problem, larger firms are expected to have
better access to higher debt consumption. Larger firms are also more diversified thus the
tendency to fail is slimmer comparatively. This indicates a positive relationship with leverage
supporting the TOT (De Jong et al., 2008; Ameer, 2010; Ramli et al., 2019; Khaw, 2019).
Nevertheless, in the case of Haron (2016), he depicts a significant negative relationship
between size and leverage for Indonesian firms, claiming that the negative relationship is
the after effect of the financial deregulation taken place where large firms are encouraged to
issue equity over debt. Firm size is measured by log of total asset (Deesomsak et al., 2009;
Haron, 2014; Khaw, 2019; Musallam, 2020). The hypothesis is that:
H2. Firm size has a positive influence on capital structure.
3.3 Business risk
Business risk of firms is related to its earnings volatility. Higher earnings volatility may be
translated to an increase of default risk on debt payments. Hence, debt financing is not an
option indicating a negative relationship with leverage as supported by Ameer (2010),
Haron (2016) and Ramli et al. (2019). Equity issuance is more preferred for business
expansion by firms with high degree of risk. Business risk is represented by yearly change
in the firm EBIT (Deesomsak et al., 2009; Haron, 2016; Kumar et al., 2017). For this variable,
the hypothesis is:
H3. Business risk has a negative influence on capital structure.
3.4 Tangibility
A positive relationship is expected between tangible assets and leverage as firms with high
tangible assets are seen as less risky to lenders. Tangible assets are easier to repossess in
bankruptcy, as explained by TOT and supported by Bunkanwanicha et al. (2008), Moosa
and Li (2012), Ramli et al. (2019) and Khaw (2019). Degryse et al. (2010) claim that tangible
assets are used to secure long-term debt and this explains the positive effect of tangibility
on leverage. Nevertheless, firms with high tangible assets appear to rely more on internal
funds generated from these assets as explained by the POT, and hence a negative
relationship with leverage (Haron, 2016). Supporting this explanation, Degryse et al. (2010)
and Qamar et al. (2016) argue that short-term debt is negatively related with asset
tangibility. Tangible asset is represented by net fixed asset over total asset (Rajan and
Zingales, 1995; Haron, 2016; Khaw, 2019). The hypothesis developed is that:
H4. Asset tangibility has a positive influence on capital structure.
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3.5 Liquidity
A liquid firm usually enjoys substantial internal funds as explained by POT and thus does
not rely on debt financing as they can opt to their huge retained earnings to fund their
operations and investments. Therefore, a negative relationship is expected between
liquidity and leverage. Firm liquidity is represented by current asset to current liabilities
(Deesomsak et al., 2009; Moosa and Li, 2012; Kumar et al., 2017; Yadav et al., 2020). The
hypothesis is that:
H5. Firm liquidity has a negative influence on capital structure.
3.6 Profitability
Firms will strive to avoid asymmetric information problem as it affects the financing choice of
a firm tremendously. Managers of highly profitable firms and cash flow seem to prefer
internal resources as their first preference, being the cheapest funds rather than using
external financing, either debt or equity to finance their investments to mitigate and avoid
asymmetric information problem (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Profitability is anticipated to
affect leverage negatively as explained by POT (Bunkanwanicha et al., 2008; Haron, 2016;
Khaw, 2019). Firm’s profitability is represented by EBIT over total asset (Rajan and Zingales,
1995; Haron, 2016). Thus, the hypothesis for this variable is:
H6. Firm profitability has a negative influence on capital structure.
3.7 Intangibility
Intangible assets such as copyright, goodwill, patent, trade mark and research and
development costs have significant impact on capital structure of firms (Rajan and Zingales,
1995). POT predicts that firms with high intangible assets face more asymmetric information
problems thus rely more on debt financing to mitigate the problems. This indicates a
positive relationship between intangible assets and leverage. Loumioti (2011) confirms that
intangible assets help firms in the USA in facing information asymmetry problems as
intangible assets such as goodwill is capable to increase borrower’s access to debt as
mitigating measure. The TOT and the agency theory however suggest a negative
association between intangible assets and leverage. Intangibility is measured by the ratio of
intangible assets to total assets (Chen and Strange, 2005; Haron, 2016). The hypothesis is
as follows:
H7. Intangibility has a positive influence on capital structure.
3.8 Growth
Rapid growth firms need substantial funds to expand further. According to the agency
theory, equity issuance will be the preferred method of financing to convey signals to
outsiders that they are free from any underinvestment and asset substitution issues. The
investors will not hesitate to invest and consequently greater expansion to the firm, hence
suggesting a negative relationship with leverage. POT also predicts a negative relationship
as good growth firms are deemed to have huge retained earnings. Growing firms with huge
retained earnings comparative to its investments and growth expenses will consequently
reduce its debt ratio (Myers and Majluf, 1984; De Jong et al., 2008; Khaw, 2019). Growth is
represented by market value of equity over book value of equity (Rajan and Zingales, 1995;
Kumar et al., 2017; Khaw, 2019). Following literature:
H8. Firm growth has a negative influence on capital structure.
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3.9 Age
Aged firms normally have accumulated rather huge funds over the years thus less needs for
debt financing either long or short-term debt. Aged firms usually have longer and
impressive track record which is translated to higher reputational value. Therefore age is
expected to negatively relate to leverage (Chen and Strange, 2005; Khaw, 2019).
Conversely, new and young firms may not accumulate enough funds thus may rely on debt
to finance their operations and expansion. Age of firm is measured from the year of listing
on the stock exchange (Chen and Strange, 2005; Haron, 2016; Musallam, 2020). Hence:
H9. Firm age has a negative influence on capital structure.
3.10 Share price performance
According to the market timing theory, when a firm is able to accumulate a strong share
price performance with the present market value relatively higher than past market values,
the firm may issue equity to finance their operation rather than debt and will repurchase
equity if the situation is otherwise. This situation indicates a negative relationship between
share price performance and leverage and is empirically evidenced by Setyawan and Budi
(2012) and Haron (2016). Share price performance is represented by yearly change in year-
end share price (Deesomsak et al., 2009; Haron, 2016). The hypothesis for this variable is
that:
H10. Share price performance has a negative influence on capital structure.
3.11 Ownership concentration
In a concentrated ownership structure, large shareholders act as the controlling
shareholder and thus have the function to monitor and control the action of managers
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Khaw, 2019; Musallam, 2020). They may use debt as a
controlling mechanism to curb managers from taking advantage by adjusting the capital
structure according to their own self-interests (Khaw, 2019). Furthermore, controlling
shareholders choose debt over equity to avoid ownership dilution as to retain control on the
firm. Controlling shareholder may also manipulate the use of debt and adopt thin
capitalization concept as to reap the interest tax shield that comes with debt financing
(Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2015). All these suggest a positive relationship between
concentrated ownership and leverage (Driffield et al., 2007; Li et al., 2009; Cespedes et al.,
2010; Khaw, 2019).
Contrastingly, controlling shareholders in a concentrated ownership can act as disciplinary
mechanism to monitor management activities, as it is much cheaper comparative to using
debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Thus a negative relationship between ownership
concentration and leverage is expected. Ownership concentration is measured based on
the shareholdings greater than 5% (Siregar and Utama, 2008; Utama et al., 2017). The
hypothesis for this variable is that:
H11. Ownership concentration has a positive influence on capital structure.
3.12 Industry munificence
Munificence is the ability of the environment in the industry to ensure durability and
sustainability of a firm (Kayo and Kimura, 2011). A firm operating in a high munificence
industry has plenty of resources but with low competition, hence reaping high profitability.
Kayo and Kimura (2011) suggest a parallel comparison between munificence-profitability
with profitability-leverage and record a negative relationship thus supporting the POT
prediction. Munificence for the year is measured by first, regressing time against sales of an
industry over the five years period under analysis to generate the regression slope
PAGE 696 j JOURNAL OF ASIA BUSINESS STUDIES j VOL. 15 NO. 5 2021
coefficient and second, taking the ratio of the regression slope coefficient to the mean value
of sales over the same period (Kayo and Kimura, 2011; Haron and Adeyemi, 2016).
Following literature:
H12. Industrymunificence has a negative influence on capital structure.
3.13 Industry dynamism
Ferri and Jones (1979) describe industry dynamism as risk, as it reflects the degree of
instability or unpredictability of an industry. According to the TOT prediction, firms operating
in an unpredictable industry environment would consume a very minimum debt. The more
dynamic the industry, the riskier it gets, the lower the debt engagement of the firm (Ferri and
Jones, 1979). Kayo and Kimura (2011) report a negative relationship between industry
dynamism and leverage. Industry dynamism is measured by dividing the standard error of
the munificence regression with the mean value of sales over the same period (Kayo and
Kimura, 2011; Haron and Adeyemi, 2016). The hypothesis is that:
H13. Industry dynamism has a negative influence on capital structure.
3.14 Industry concentration
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is commonly used to calculate the degree of
industry concentration. MacKay and Phillips (2005) explain that the higher the HHI, where
significant entry barriers exist, the higher the debt consumption. MacKay and Phillips (2005)
also claim that profitability, size and risk are higher in a highly concentrated industry. Firms
pursue higher return when investing in high risk projects with high level of debt indicating a
positive relationship between HHI and leverage as explained by the TOT. Kayo and Kimura
(2011) on the other hand find a negative relationship between HHI and leverage, implying
that highly concentrated industry does not encourage firms to use higher debt, as it may be
exposed to higher bankruptcy risk. HHI is measured based on the sum of the squares of
market shares (sales) of firms within a given industry for the year (Kayo and Kimura, 2011;
Haron and Adeyemi, 2016; Wang et al., 2018). Based on literature, the hypothesis is:
H14. Industry concentration (HHI) has significant effect on capital structure.
Table 1 summarize the variables, measurement, hypotheses and the expected signs of the
relationships.
4. Data and methodology
4.1 Data
This study analyses 402 non-financial listed Indonesian firms between 2000 and 2014 with
firm data extracted from the Datastream, whereas data on ownership is manually collected
from the annual reports of firms. Financial firms (banks, insurance companies and
investments trusts) are excluded from the sample, following the literature (Khaw, 2019). The
402 sample firms consist of 75% out of 537 listed firms on the IDX (as at November, 2016),
and this proportion could be regarded as the whole population of firms for generalization
purposes. The sample covers firms from various industries of listing including agriculture,
consumer products, industrial, infrastructure and utilities, mining, properties, trade and
services and miscellaneous industry. Table 2 describes the detail of the sample firms
according to industries. Only firms with a minimum of three consecutive observations
towards the end of the study period are included in the data set (Deesomsak et al., 2009;
Haron, 2016), meaning the firms should at least be listed on the IDX from the year 2012.
Unbalanced panel data is used due to the different listing dates of firms within the study
period of 2000–2014.
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Table 1 Variables, measurement, hypothesis and expected signs
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(1) regressing time against sales of an industry over the
5 years period under analysis and (2) taking the ratio of
the regression slope coefficient to the mean value of
sales over the same period
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the mean value of sales over the same period
Sum of the squares of market








Table 2 Number of firms and percentage in each industry
Industry No. of firms (%)
Agriculture 21 5.22
Consumer products 36 8.96
Industrial 62 15.42
Infrastructure and utilities 47 11.69
Mining 36 8.96
Properties 51 12.69
Trade and services 110 27.36
Miscellaneous 39 9.70
Total sample 402 100
Notes: Industry classification is following the general industry listing of the Indonesia Stock Exchange
Source: www.idx.co.id/
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4.2 Methodology








This study uses a dynamic panel regression to estimate the relationship between firm
leverage and firm- and industry-level determinants, estimated based on GMM (one-step
and two-step system-GMM) and applied Windmeijer’s finite sample correction using
Stata xtabond2. GMM is a panel data estimator that is widely used to control for
endogeneity (Soetanto and Liem, 2019; Brahmana et al., 2019), as well as to cater for
the dynamic nature of the capital structure study (Asarkaya and Özcan, 2007;
Getzmann et al., 2010; Haron, 2016; Muchtar et al., 2018). Moreover, in situations
where panel data set consists of small T and large N (as in this study), GMM estimator
is most suitable when independent variables are not strictly exogenous; there is a
presence of fixed individual effects, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Soetanto
and Liem, 2019; Brahmana et al., 2019; Al-ahdal et al., 2020). The leverage function is
specified as:
Levit ¼ aþ Levit 1ð Þ þ b 1NDTSit þ b 2SIZEit þ b 3RISKit þ b 4TANGit þ b 5LIQit
þ b 6PROFit þ b 7INTANGit þ b 8GROWit þ b 9AGEit þ b 10SPPit
þ b 11OWNit þ b 12MUNt þ b 13DYNt þ b 14HHIt þ « it
(1)





. Firm level determinants comprise of NDTS (non-debt tax shield), SIZE
(firm size), RISK (business risk), TANG (asset tangibility), LIQ (liquidity), PROF (profitability),
INTANG (intangibility), GROW (growth), AGE (firm age), SPP (share price performance),
OWN (ownership concentration) and industry level determinants – MUN (industry
munificence), DYN (industry dynamism), HHI (industry concentration), and « it is the
error term.
Based on equation (1), this study performs eight regression models (one-step and two-
step system-GMM) with leverage definitions of TDTA and
STD
TA i.e. Models (1-A), (1-B), (1-C)
and (1-D). Model (1-A) includes all the 14 independent variables as in equation (1);
Model (1-B) includes all the 14 independent variables with controlling for the financial
crisis of 2007/2008; Model (1-C) includes all the 14 independent variables with
controlling for the financial crisis of 2007/2008 and sub-sectors; and Model (1-D):
includes 11 of the independent variables with controlling for the financial crisis of 2007/
2008 and sub-sectors (the last three related industry variables were removed[1]).
Following Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015), the period of analysis (2000–2014) is divided
into three: (before the crisis: 2000–2006), (during the crisis: 2007–2008); and (after the
crisis: 2009–2014). Only during and after the crisis periods (two dummies) were
included in the related models, whereas the period before the crisis is considered as
the reference period (Cordazzo et al., 2017). Similarly, seven sector dummies for the
eight sub-sectors (agricultural, consumer products, industrial, infrastructure and utilities,
mining, properties, trade and services and miscellaneous) are used to control for
sector-specific effects (Altaf and Shah, 2018). The variables (leverage(1), NDTS, firm
size, risk, tangibility, liquidity, profitability and growth) are treated as endogenous
following the literature (Asarkaya and Özcan, 2007; Getzmann et al., 2010).
The standard diagnostic tests are performed to ensure the efficiency of the GMM
estimators, (Nomran and Haron, 2019; Soetanto and Liem, 2019; Al-ahdal et al., 2020). The
tests are the Wald test (null: all coefficients on the determinants are jointly equal zero); the
second order serial correlation test AR(2) (null: no second order serial correlation in
the residuals) and the Hansen-test, a test for the validity of the instrumental variables
representing Levit(1) (null: instrumental variables are valid). Estimates derived from the
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GMM are only consistent if there is no second order serial correlation in the residuals and
instrumental variables are valid (Soetanto and Liem, 2019; Brahmana et al., 2019; Al-ahdal
et al., 2020). Variance inflation factor (VIF) is performed to check whether there is
multicollinearity problem between variables in the model. The VIF should be less than 10, as
shown in Table 3, to confirm that there is no multicollinearity problem in the data set
(Soetanto and Liem, 2019).
5. Analysis and findings
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables in this study. Indonesian firms
use mean leverage of 0.3691 and 0.2673 of TDTA and
STD
TA , respectively, in their capital
structure. Ownership concentration shows, on average 47.64% ownership exceeding
5% shareholding with the maximum and minimum of 100% and zero, respectively. This
















Mean VIF 1.17 1.17
Table 4 Descriptive statistics (whole sample)
Variable Mean Maximum Minimum Median Standard deviation
TD/TA 0.3691 0.9020 0.0998 0.3355 0.1872
STD/TA 0.2673 0.8420 0.0998 0.2133 0.1642
NDTS 0.0310 0.6045 0.0000 0.0244 0.0384
Firm size 11.5277 16.8969 4.1109 11.5955 1.7817
Risk 0.0594 28.5000 29.7739 0.0275 3.0502
Tangibility 0.3922 0.9852 0.0000 0.3677 0.2504
Liquidity 2.1793 29.8679 0.1027 1.4378 2.6678
Profitability 0.0654 2.8310 2.9565 0.0672 0.1791
Intangible 0.0164 0.9650 0.0000 0.0000 0.0621
Growth 8.3666 97.8479 0.6000 2.9101 14.2480
Age 15.4104 38.0000 3.0000 15.0000 7.6098
SPP 0.0058 2.7810 4.8121 0.0010 0.2038
Ownership 0.4764 1.0000 0.0000 0.5700 0.3383
Munificence 0.1563 0.4041 0.0050 0.1534 0.0751
Dynamism 0.0544 0.1592 0.0081 0.0493 0.0310
HHI 0.1420 0.4841 0.0398 0.0961 0.1082
Notes: Number of all firms = 402; number of observations = 4737 for each variable. SPP = share price
performance, HHI = Herfindahl–Hirschman Index
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statistic shows that the ownership structure of public listed firms in Indonesia is highly
concentrated, supporting Utama et al. (2017) and Musallam (2020).
5.2 Determinants of leverage
Tables 5 (one step-system-GMM) and 6 (two step-system-GMM) present the results on
determinants of leverage. First, the current capital structure of Indonesian firms is
influenced by the previous year capital structure position (autoregressive), confirming the
dynamic nature of capital structure in Indonesian firms. Second, nine determinants are
found to significantly influence leverage throughout the period understudy, i.e. firm level
determinants: tangibility, liquidity, profitability, intangible, growth, age and ownership and
industry-level determinants: dynamism and industry concentration.
This study finds an inverse relationship between tangibility and leverage (both TDTA and
STD
TA ),
consistent for all models, in contrast to the positive relationship as expected in H4. Firms in
Indonesia with high tangible assets appear to rely more on internal funds generated from
these assets as explained by the POT, hence a negative relationship with leverage
(Degryse et al., 2010; Qamar et al., 2016; Haron, 2016).
Liquidity is depicted to relate negatively with leverage (TDTA and
STD
TA ), consistent for all models,
supporting H5. Highly liquid firms in Indonesia seem to generate high retained earnings
thus reduce their debt engagement. The influence of POT is detected here consistent with
Deesomsak et al. (2009), Moosa and Li (2012) and Haron and Adeyemi (2016).
Profitability shows a negative relationship with leverage (TDTA and
STD
TA ), consistent for all
models, H6 is thus supported. Implying the existence of POT, highly profitable firms in
Indonesia opt for retained earnings to finance their investments. Supporting Bunkanwanicha
et al. (2008), Moosa and Li (2012), Haron (2016) and Haron and Adeyemi (2016), the
negative relationship reported reflects the after effect of the financial reformation taken
place in Indonesia which have encouraged firms to turn to their retained earnings rather
than merely relying on bank loans to finance their investments.
Intangible asset also shows a negative relationship with leverage (TDTA and
STD
TA ), consistent for
all models (One-Step) except for TDTA (Two-Step, exclude Model 1-D). This is in contrast to H7
where a positive relationship is expected. The negative relationship documented in this
study is not consistent with past literature especially on the developed market. It is worth
noting that intangible assets are not recognized as collateral to secure debt from lenders by
the Bank Indonesia (the central bank). The central bank regards intangible assets as
lacking in economic value and cannot be traded (Mulyani et al., 2014) thus does not impose
a policy of intangible asset as a fiduciary security object. This condition may well justify the
negative relationship between intangibility and leverage depicted in this study. Furthermore,
the value of these assets is not easy to measure and being so would be difficult to value and
anticipate the risk to the bank. Nevertheless, though this result does not support the stylized
fact of the effect of intangible asset on capital structure, it is worth noting that intangibility
should be recognized as collateral, as intangible asset such as goodwill is capable to
increase borrower’s access to debt as confirmed by Loumioti (2011). Other countries
sharing similar economic landscape could consider this finding in devising their policy.
Growth shows a positive relationship with leverage (TDTA and
STD
TA ), consistent for all models, in
contrast to H8 where a negative relationship is expected. Explained by the agency theory,
rapid growing firms take on more short-term debt to tackle any underinvestment problems
that might occur (Myers, 2003) thus explains the positive relationship depicted in this study.
Growth firms in Indonesia might also engage with debt rather than equity as they could reap
the advantage of tax shield from debt financing. This might also reflect the thin capitalization
concept discussed earlier. Engaging with higher debt level to take advantage of the interest
tax shield (TOT) may be the tax planning strategy by firms in Indonesia, as the government
still postpones the implementation of thin capitalization rules during the period understudy
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Notes: Standard coefficients are presented (p-values in parentheses). ,  and  are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively;
Model (1-A) includes all the 14 independent variables as in equation (1); Model (1-B) includes all the 14 independent variables with
controlling for the financial crisis of 2007/2008; Model (1-C) includes all the 14 independent variables with controlling for the financial
crisis and sub-sectors; and Model (1-D) includes 11 of the independent variables with controlling for the financial crisis and sub-sectors
(the last three related industry variables were removed). Following Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015), the period of analysis (2000–2014) is
divided into three: (before the crisis: 2000–2006), (during the crisis: 2007–2008); and (after the crisis: 2009–2014). Only during and after
the crisis periods (two dummies) are included in the related models, whereas the period before the crisis is considered as the reference
period (Cordazzo et al., 2017). Similarly, seven sector dummies for eight sub-sectors are used to control for sector-specific effects (Altaf
and Shah, 2018). The variables (leverage(1), NDTS, firm size, risk, tangibility, liquidity, profitability and growth) are treated as
endogenous following the literature (Asarkaya and Özcan, 2007; Getzmann et al., 2010). The financial crisis and sector dummies are
included in the related models but not reported here. Stata software v14 was used for analysing hypotheses test based on system-GMM
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Notes: Standard coefficients are presented (p-values in parentheses). ,  and  are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively;
Model (1-A) includes all the 14 independent variables as in equation (1); Model (1-B) includes all the 14 independent variables with
controlling for the financial crisis of 2007/2008; Model (1-C) includes all the 14 independent variables with controlling for the financial
crisis and sub-sectors; and Model (1-D) includes 11 of the independent variables with controlling for the financial crisis and sub-sectors
(the last three related industry variables were removed). Following Saghi-Zedek and Tarazi (2015), the period of analysis (2000–2014) is
divided into three: (before the crisis: 2000–2006), (during the crisis: 2007–2008); and (after the crisis: 2009–2014). Only during and after
the crisis periods (two dummies) are included in the related models, whereas the period before the crisis is considered as the reference
period (Cordazzo et al., 2017). Similarly, seven sector dummies for eight sub-sectors are used to control for sector-specific effects (Altaf
and Shah, 2018). The variables (leverage(1), NDTS, firm size, risk, tangibility, liquidity, profitability and growth) are treated as
endogenous following the literature (Asarkaya and Özcan, 2007; Getzmann et al., 2010). The financial crisis and sector dummies are
included in the related models but not reported here. Stata software v14 was used for analysing hypotheses test based on system-GMM
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thus does not limit the amount of the interest tax shield. This positive relationship is also
reported by Booth et al. (2001) in their study on emerging countries and Haron and
Adeyemi (2016) and Ramli et al. (2019) on Indonesia, respectively.
Age of firm relates negatively with leverage (TDTA), supporting H9, as shown in Model 1-A and
1-C (one-step and two-step). This finding supports the argument that aged firms are able to
accumulate huge funds throughout the years and thus need less debt in their capital
structure. Looking at the sample firms used in this study about 53% of the firms have been
listed for more than 15years with the average of 15.41 years. As explained by Chen and
Strange (2005) and Khaw (2019) aged firms normally keep impressive track record with
substantial retained earnings thus debt is not an option. The negative relationship between
age and leverage reflects the influence of POT in the capital structure of firms in Indonesia.
Higher level of concentrated ownership positively relate with leverage (TDTA and
STD
TA ), as
evidenced in most of the models, supporting H11, in line with Driffield et al. (2007) and
Khaw (2019). The positive relationship depicted explains the use of debt as disciplinary
mechanism by large controlling shareholders in a highly concentrated ownership over the
managers (agency theory). Such finding may also be because of large controlling
shareholders wanting to avoid ownership dilution via equity issuance thus opts for debt
consumption instead. This situation as depicted in this study could be a good inference to
countries having similar ownership structure in modeling their corporate financing.
Moreover, again the thin capitalization concept can perhaps be one of the justifications of
the positive relationship found in this study. Controlling shareholders are taking advantage
of the interest tax shield that comes with debt (TOT), as the implementation of thin
capitalization rules are still being put on hold during the period understudy thus firms are
taking the fullest advantage by engaging maximum debt level.
In term of industry level determinants, dynamism relates negatively with leverage (TDTA and
STD
TA ), as evidenced in most of the models, hence supporting H13. The concept of dynamism
being interpreted as risk (Ferri and Jones, 1979) is reflected in this finding. It is apparent
that firms in Indonesia operating in a highly dynamic environment avoid debt consumption
as to avoid risk. In addition, based on the TOT prediction, firms operating in an
unpredictable industry environment would consume low debt, in support of Kayo and
Kimura (2011). Industry concentration (HHI) is found to positively influenced leverage (TDTA
and STDTA ), as evidenced in most of the models, hence supports H14. This finding supports
the argument by MacKay and Phillips (2005) explaining that the higher the HHI, where
significant entry barriers exist, the higher the debt consumption of the firm. Firms pursue
higher returns when investing in high risk projects with high level of debt, supporting the
TOT. A report on Indonesia by IIMA (2018) that highly concentrated industry in Indonesia
such as mining remains high in leverage since 2010 up to 2018 seems to lend support to
this finding. IIMA also reports that leverage to industry’s gross domestic product (GDP)
reached as high as 40% in 2014 before reaching 30% in 2018.
However, certain determinants (NDTS, size, risk, share price performance and industry
munificence) do not seem to have significant influence of the capital structure of firms in
Indonesia during the period understudy even though they are reported as significant factors
in past studies. The finding of this study is summarized in Table 7, and the two-quadrant
relationship diagram representing high level of determinant and debt is shown in Figure 1.
6. Conclusion
This study investigates the effects of firm- as well as industry-level determinants on capital
structure of firms in Indonesia using a dynamic panel model, and the results are robust to
the different definitions of leverage, heterogeneity, autocorrelation, multicollinearity and
endogeneity concern.
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It is apparent that certain firm-level determinants such as firm tangibility, liquidity,
profitability, intangibility, growth, age and concentrated ownership significantly influence the
capital structure of the firms understudy.
Industry-level determinants also have noticeable influence on the capital structure of these
firms. Firm operating in highly concentrated industries and in a less dynamic environment is
observed to use higher debt. Rapid growing firms in Indonesia engage with high debt ratio
because of low asymmetric information issues. It may also be because these growing firms
get better access to bank loans following the competitive banking industry after the financial
reformation. These firms take fullest advantage of the interest tax shield offered by
engaging with higher debt (thin capitalization) and are willing to take higher risk for higher
return. All these show the work of TOT in the financing decisions of the firms understudy.
Nevertheless, aged and highly liquid firms with high profit and high tangible and
intangible assets operating in a high dynamic environment seem to practice the
hierarchical financing (POT) and reduce their debt reliance. This is explained by the risk










NDTS H1: negative Not supported – – –
Firm size H2: positive Not supported – – –
Risk H3: negative Not supported – – –
Tangibility H4: positive Not supported negative POT Yes
Liquidity H5: negative Supported negative POT Yes
Profitability H6: negative Supported negative POT Yes
Intangibility H7: positive Not supported negative TOT/Agency Yes
Growth H8: negative Not supported positive TOT/Agency Yes
Age H9: negative Supported negative POT No
SPP H10: negative Not supported – – –
Ownership H11: positive Supported positive Agency/TOT Yes
Munificence H12: negative Not supported – – –
Dynamism H13: negative Supported negative TOT Yes
HH Index H14: significant Supported positive TOT Yes
Notes: SPP = share price performance, HHI = Herfindahl–Hirschman Index; POT = pecking order theory; TOT = trade-off theory
Figure 1 Two-quadrant relationship (determinants and debt)
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that comes with debt financing thus high level of debt is not an option. With regards to
firms operating in a highly concentrated industry, firms consume higher leverage. The
concentrated ownership phenomenon also poses significant influence over the capital
structure of the firms understudy. The positive relationship depicted in this study may be
justified by the concern over ownership dilution by the controlling shareholders thus
avoid equity issuance entirely.
This study offers policy implication. Tangible and intangible assets do have substantial influence
over capital structure of firms in Indonesia. With respect to that, the central bank of Indonesia
should perhaps consider accepting intangible assets as collateral to support firm’s growth,
especially firms that are subject to high asymmetric information, high volatility of earnings but with
low collateral value. Examples of such firms may include research and development intensive
firms such as the young public high-tech firms. By recognizing intangible assets as collateral may
perhaps encourage these firms to take on more debt in their financing strategy. This might then
encourage policymakers to promote conducive local bond market to attract these firms to engage
with debt financing, making bondmarket to be more vibrant and active.
The insights from this study contribute significantly to the literature. Both developed and
emerging markets can also benefit and learn from this study of Indonesia particularly on the
significant influence of intangible assets to leverage and the potential of these assets as
collateral to secure debts for certain types of firms as discussed above. The inclusion of
industry characteristics is novel, as it offers new insights on how industry characteristics
and the environment of the industry the firm is operating in can influence capital structure of
firms especially in emerging market. Policymaker may want to improve on debt policy
following the negative relationship depicted in this study relating to industry dynamic and
debt ratio and the higher debt consume by highly concentrated industry. One possible way
is to increase the size and liquidity of the local bond market. OECD (2018) reports that
Indonesian bond market is relatively small and dominated by government issuance resulted
firms to have less alternative to borrow except from banks. OECD also reports that the
developments of corporate sector that accounts for about 70% of bank lending should be
continuously monitored as a risk factor to the banking sector of Indonesia.
Looking at the ownership structure, other emerging markets with high ownership concentration
can infer valuable insights and information relating to debt and ownership concentration as
depicted in this study. Debt can act as an effective controlling mechanism to curb managers from
taking advantage of the cash flows and investments to satisfy at their own self-interest. Debt can
also act as a protection instrument to avoid ownership dilution to ensure continuous controlling
power of the firm and be an effective tax planning strategy as explained by the thin capitalization
where firms can reap maximum interest tax shield from debt consumption.
This study however has limitation. Even though this study uses longitudinal data with quite bigger
sample firms, the results still need to be cautiously interpreted. The industry regression is not
performed individually, rather are pooled together to serve the purpose of this study that is to
examine the effecting factors without giving specific focus on a particular industry. It is
recommended that for future research, examination can be done on individual industry as firms in
different industry may react differently responding to certain characteristic of each individual
industry. To explore further and for a more comprehensive insights on the issue of concentrated
ownership and its influence on capital structure, it is recommended that future research
incorporate ownership identity and political connection on debt financing of Indonesian firms.
Therefore, a more conclusive and detail scenario can be captured for future improvement of firms
in Indonesia in particular and firms in the rest of emerging markets as a whole.
Note
1. The three industry variables were removed to ensure that the findings are robust by removing any
similar related explanatory variables with controlling variables.
PAGE 706 j JOURNAL OF ASIA BUSINESS STUDIES j VOL. 15 NO. 5 2021
References
Al-Ahdal, W.M., Alsamhi, M.H., Tabash, M.I. and Farhand, N.H.S. (2020), “The impact of corporate
governance on financial performance of Indian and GCC listed firms: an empirical investigation”,
Research in International Business and Finance, Vol. 51No. 1, pp. 1-13.
Altaf, N. and Shah, F.A. (2018), “Ownership concentration and firm performance in Indian firms: does investor
protectionqualitymatter?”, Journal of IndianBusinessResearch, Vol. 10No. 1, pp. 33-52.
Ameer, R. (2010), “Financial liberalization and firms’ capital structure adjustments evidence from
Southeast Asia and South America”, Journal of Economics and Finance, Vol. 37 No. 1, pp. 1-32.
Ang, J.S., Fatemi, A. and Tourani, A. (1997), “Capital structure and dividend policies of Indonesian firms”,
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 87-103.
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